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Abstract 
Objective: Coronavirus disease (COVID‑19) was officially declared a pandemic in March 2020. Many cases of COVID‑
19 are nosocomial, but to the best of our knowledge, no nosocomial outbreaks on psychiatric departments of severe 
acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS‑CoV‑2) have been reported in Europe. The different nature of psychia‑
try makes outbreak management more difficult. This study determines which psychiatry specific factors contributed 
to a nosocomial outbreak taking place in a psychiatric department. This will provide possible interventions in future 
outbreak management.
Method: A case series describing a nosocomial outbreak in a psychiatric department of an acute care hospital in the 
Netherlands between March 13, 2020 and April, 14 2020. The outbreak was analyzed by combining data from stand‑
ardized interviews, polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests and whole genome sequencing (WGS).
Results: The nosocomial outbreak in which 43% of staff of the psychiatric department and 19% of admitted patients 
were involved, was caused by healthcare worker (HCW)‑to‑HCW transmissions, as well as patient‑to‑HCW‑to‑patient 
transmission. We identified four aspects associated with the mental health care system which might have made our 
department more susceptible to an outbreak.
Conclusions: Infection control measures designed for hospitals are not directly applicable to psychiatric depart‑
ments. Psychiatric patients should be considered a high‑risk group for infectious diseases and customized measures 
should be designed and implemented. Extra attention for psychiatric departments is necessary during a pandemic 
as psychiatric HCWs are less familiar with outbreak management. Clear communication and governance is crucial in 
correctly implementing these measures.
Keywords: COVID‑19, Hospital psychiatry, Nosocomial outbreak, Hospital outbreak management
© The Author(s) 2020. Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which 
permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the 
original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or 
other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line 
to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory 
regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this 
licence, visit http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver (http://creat iveco 
mmons .org/publi cdoma in/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated in a credit line to the data.
Introduction
In December 2019, an unknown coronavirus was linked 
to a surge in patients with fever and pneumonia in China. 
The causative agent was identified as severe acute res-
piratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) and 
the resulting disease was named coronavirus disease 
(COVID-19). On March 11, the World Health Organi-
zation (WHO) declared COVID-19 a pandemic. It is 
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thought that ongoing surveillance of SARS-CoV-2 is 
warranted as a re-emergence of the disease could still 
occur over the following years [1]. Consequently, pro-
longed continuation of social distancing policies might 
be needed for the foreseeable future to avoid an overbur-
dening of the health care system [1].
SARS-CoV-2 is a betacoronavirus related to severe 
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) virus [2, 3]. Routes 
of transmission include person-to-person spread via res-
piratory droplets and by touching contaminated objects 
[4, 5]. The mean incubation interval is 5.2 days, with 95% 
of the cases occurring in maximum 12.5 days following 
infection [6]. Evidence suggests that transmission might 
occur more frequently at the onset of infection [7]. The 
initial presentation consisted of fever, fatigue and a dry 
cough, but other, milder symptoms have also now been 
documented [8]. The majority of infections are mild 
(81%) and self-limiting. Severe and critical infections 
account for about 14 and 5% of cases, and may be com-
plicated by acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) 
and multiple organ failure [9]. Since the clinical manifes-
tation of infection ranges from severe to asymptomatic, 
there have been concerns that transmission might be able 
to occur due to unquarantined individuals and healthcare 
workers (HCWs) with no or few symptoms going unno-
ticed [8].
Hospital outbreaks are either nosocomial or commu-
nity-acquired, can place a heavy burden on already over-
whelmed health care systems [10, 11], and pose risks to 
both patients and medical staff. One study found that 
in 41% of admitted patients with COVID-19, nosoco-
mial transmission was the suspected source of infec-
tion, whereas another study found that HCWs accounted 
for 3.8% of total cases [12, 13]. It is thought that inade-
quate personal protection, insufficient understanding of 
COVID-19 and infection and prevention control, pro-
longed exposure to large groups of infected patients and 
lack of personal protective equipment (PPE) contributed 
to an increase in nosocomial infections in HCWs [14, 15]. 
It is discussed that inpatient psychiatric care faces spe-
cific challenges, including the risk for nosocomial out-
breaks [16].
To the best of our knowledge, no nosocomial outbreaks 
on psychiatric departments have yet been described in 
Western countries. In March 2020, the department of 
psychiatry of the Canisius-Wilhelmina Hospital (CWZ) 
in Nijmegen reported a sudden increase in SARS-CoV-2 
infections amongst both admitted psychiatric patients 
and medical staff. A nosocomial outbreak of COVID-19 
was declared on March 23. We conducted a case series to 
identify the weaknesses and risk factors within the men-
tal health care system, which may contribute to nosoco-
mial outbreaks in psychiatry.
Methods
Setting
The nosocomial outbreak occurred in the CWZ in 
Nijmegen, The Netherlands. The CWZ is a 480-bed acute 
care hospital. The outbreak was limited to the psychiatric 
department, which consists of an 18-bedded psychiatric 
ward, an outpatient clinic and a consultation-liaison unit, 
and currently employs 70 HCWs.
On March 1, 2020, the CWZ implemented precaution-
ary measures to prevent further spread of SARS-CoV-2 
infections. General measures included reverse transcrip-
tion polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) testing of all 
symptomatic patients and HCWs, stringent practice of 
hand hygiene, social distancing and (contact and droplet) 
isolation of (suspected) SARS-CoV-2 patients. Additional 
measures aimed at employees consisted of self-reporting 
of symptoms and measuring body temperature twice 
daily. HCWs with COVID-19 symptoms and/or fever, 
were tested. Following the test they were not allowed 
to return to work until they had been symptom-free for 
72 h. Employees without a fever and without specific 
symptoms were not tested and were allowed to work 
using surgical masks.
Case identification
The identification of suspected employees relied on them 
reporting their signs and symptoms to the occupational 
health service (OHS). Based on the probability of infec-
tion, nasopharyngeal swabs (PCR) for SARS-CoV-2 were 
performed. Suspected patients were identified by the 
attending psychiatrist, and were tested accordingly. We 
defined confirmed cases based on a positive test result. 
Suspected cases who tested negatively were also included, 
as negative PCR tests are known to be false negative, due 
to sampling errors, premature or delayed testing or an 
inadequate swab technique. Verbal informed consent was 
obtained from all HCWs and two out of three patients, 
as the third patient was deceased at the study’s onset. All 
was carried out accordingly to Dutch law and the code of 
conduct in scientific research.
Design
A standardized questionnaire was carried out amongst 
confirmed and suspected cases in order to collect data. 
The signs and symptoms in our questionnaire were 
based on a similar case questionnaire used by the min-
isterial department of health of the New South Wales 
Government in Australia [17]. Questions about employ-
ees’ working schedules were added. The collected data 
included demographic information, signs and symp-
toms and their date of onset, SARS-CoV-2 test results, 
risk factors and clinical outcome. In order to reconstruct 
a suspected chain of transmission, we interviewed the 
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confirmed cases, the attending psychiatrist responsible 
for the psychiatric ward and the head of the psychiatric 
department. Additionally, we reviewed employees’ work-
ing schedules and patients’ medical records.
Diagnostics
RT- PCR targeting of the E-gene was performed on naso-
pharyngeal swabs from patients and HCWs. Ribonucleic 
acid (RNA) was isolated using the Roche MagnaPure 96 
in combination with the master mix (Taqman Fast Virus 
1-Step master mix). PCR was performed by using primers 
and probes as described by Corman et al. [18]. WGS was 
carried out on positive samples according to the methods 
described by Oude Munnink et al. [19]. In short, 87 over-
lapping amplicons spanning the entire genome were gen-
erated in two different reactions, after which they were 
sequenced on the Nanopore sequencing platform.
Minimum spanning tree
A minimum spanning tree (MST) was made using the 
generated SARS-CoV-2 genome sequences. Sequence 
distance was calculated based on absolute nucleotide and 
gap-block distance using the Analysis of Phylogenetics 
and Evolution (APE) R package [20]. The MST was sub-
sequently derived from the all-vs-all sequence distance 
network using the igraph R package [21]. The visualiza-
tion was generated using the visNetwork R package.
Results
A total of 33 cases were identified between March 13, 
2020 and April 14, 2020, of which 15 cases were con-
firmed and 18 cases were suspected. The confirmed cases 
consisted of 3 patients and 12 HCWs, amounting to 19% 
of total admitted patients and 17% of the total staff num-
ber. The remainder of suspected cases (n = 18) consisted 
of HCWs only and amounted to 43% of the total staff 
number. No other admitted patients were considered 
suspected cases. The mean age of all cases was 43.3 years, 
61% were female and HCWs accounted for 91% of cases 
(Table  1). One patient died due to COVID-19, whereas 
no fatalities occurred in HCWs.
Outbreak timeline
On March 9, 2020, the first patient and HCW started 
showing symptoms of COVID-19 (see Fig. 1). The patient 
was tested within 48 h after onset of symptoms and was 
found to be negative for SARS-CoV-2. The HCW was 
not tested for COVID-19 and continued to work without 
PPE, thereby unwittingly ignoring national guidelines.
On March 15, the second patient started showing 
symptoms (Fig. 1). The patient had been admitted to the 
psychiatric department the day before. She was brought 
in by her son who was not feeling well at the time and 
developed a fever the following day. The patient was in 
a catatonic state and therefore adequate screening for 
COVID-19 was not possible. On March 17, 2020, the 
patient also developed fever, was directly placed in con-
tact droplet isolation and was subsequently tested posi-
tive for COVID-19 the day after. Infection control was 
consulted to discuss the first confirmed case on the psy-
chiatric department. Infection control found that the 
hospital wide infection prevention policy was only par-
tially implemented on the psychiatric ward. The imple-
mented measures of social distancing between patients 
and HCWs, twice daily measuring of body temperature 
of patients and HCWs, and the adequate use of PPE by 
HCWs when tending to patients, were not followed sat-
isfactorily. Additionally, group therapy for admitted 
patients continued to take place.
On March 18, when reporting of symptoms was 
strictly implemented for employees and patients, the 
first employees of the psychiatric department tested 
positive for COVID-19. These employees had been 
in close contact to the second patient without using 
PPE. Retrospectively, eight employees and two patients 
showed COVID-19 symptoms in the period from 
March 17 to March 20, 2020. Not every employee 
reporting loss of smell and/or taste was tested, as this 
was not classified as a symptom of COVID-19 at the 
time. Due to conflicting advice from the OHS, multiple 
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HCWs continued to work with symptoms. Addition-
ally, a third patient started showing COVID-19 symp-
toms and, after an initial symptom free interval, the 
first patient developed new symptoms. Both tested 
positive on March 19 and March 23 respectively.
On March 23, additional infection control measures 
were implemented on the psychiatric department to 
limit further transmission. These measures included 
transferring SARS-CoV-2 positive patients to desig-
nated hospital wards, classifying all remaining patients 
and personnel as SARS-CoV-2 suspected, measuring 
body temperature of patients thrice daily and actively 
enquiring about COVID-19 symptoms, demanding all 
employees wear surgical masks at all times, reducing 
bed-capacity to 8 beds, reducing working staff, train-
ing of staff in the use of PPE and implementing stricter 
compliance to the hospital wide COVID-19 policies 
(e.g. social distancing, hand hygiene, reporting of 
symptoms and measuring body temperature by per-
sonnel twice daily).
On March 31, no new patients were discovered and 
the outbreak was considered to be contained. Staff 
members were obligated to wear a surgical mask until 
April 14. All other implemented measures remained in 
place.
Outbreak interpretation
The epidemic curve does not show a clear index case. Due 
to insufficient testing of both symptomatic and asympto-
matic HCWs, and the absence of serological tests for the 
identification of previous infections, the results are not 
conclusive. Furthermore, one patient was tested within 
48 h after onset of symptoms and was not retested. Cur-
rent policies dictate that retesting is necessary, since the 
first test may be false negative.
Out of the 15 samples of confirmed cases, seven sam-
ples, belonging to five HCWs and two patients, were sub-
jected to WGS. Nine samples had a cycle threshold (CT) 
value higher than 30, thereby making WGS impossible. 
The minimum spanning tree (MST, Additional file  1) 
revealed that four out of five HCWs’ samples and both 
patients’ samples were identical and one HCW‘s sample 
was only separated by a single nucleotide. Based on the 
combined evidence of the probability of exposure, PCR 
positive test results and WGS, it is evident that transmis-
sion occurred between patients and HCWs. Furthermore, 
three confirmed HCWs had no contact with confirmed 
patients, but did have contact with confirmed colleagues, 
thereby implying that transmission between HCWs took 
place as well. In Fig. 2 the likeliest route of transmission 
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Fig. 1 Suspected and confirmed cases of HCWs and patients with SARS‑CoV‑2 by date of onset of symptoms from March 6 to March 31, 2020. 
Duration of hospital admission and isolation of patients 1–3 are visualized accordingly
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HCW (depicted as C15 in Fig.  2) had a husband with 
COVID-19 symptoms, who worked at another healthcare 
institution experiencing an outbreak, and another HCW 
(depicted as C8) belonged to a different cluster. There-
fore, it is possible that multiple introductions occurred 
on the department.
Discussion
The aim of our research was to identify the weaknesses 
and risk factors within psychiatry which may contrib-
ute to nosocomial outbreaks. We identified four aspects 
associated with psychiatry which made our department 
more susceptible to an outbreak, and from which valu-
able lessons could be learned in order to prevent out-
breaks in the future.
The psychiatric population
Psychiatric patients are more at risk during a pandemic. 
Firstly, patients with severe mental illness are more 
susceptible to pulmonary infections, whereas patients 
with depressive disorders are more at risk of develop-
ing infectious diseases in general [22–24]. Secondly, 
the recognition and management of physical disease in 
psychiatric patients is often suboptimal in comparison 
with the general population [25, 26]. Psychiatrists often 
consider it their primary task to exclusively treat psy-
chiatric illnesses, thereby possibly overlooking signs of 
physical disease [27]. Furthermore, patients with severe 
mental illness are often unaware of their physical symp-
toms due to cognitive deficits or reduced pain sensitiv-
ity, and frequently have trouble communicating [26]. For 
instance, our second patient’s presentation of symptoms 
was severely impaired due to her catatonic state. Thirdly, 
mental illnesses and psychiatric medications tend to 
negatively influence patients’ capabilities of compre-
hending and following instructions [26], which is cru-
cial for adequate reporting of symptoms and adhering 
to preventive measures [28]. Lastly, contrary to patients 
admitted to general hospital departments, admitted psy-
chiatric patients are often ambulatory, eat meals together, 
Fig. 2 Probable route of transmission of 15 confirmed cases of SARS‑CoV‑2 in the nosocomial outbreak, linked to each other based on probability, 
PCR results and WGS
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undergo group therapy and interact with one another 
in close proximity, consequently facilitating the rapid 
spread of infection. The aforementioned aspects cause 
psychiatric departments to be at a higher risk for noso-
comial outbreaks, thereby reinforcing the notion that the 
psychiatric population should be considered a high risk 
group. Nonconventional methods of infection prevention 
such as having patients use personal protective equip-
ment (PPE) instead of isolation, which were successfully 
implemented in a French psychiatric hospital during 
previous influenza outbreaks, should be considered dur-
ing outbreak management on psychiatric departments 
in the future [28]. Additionally, more proactive testing, 
especially when in doubt or when patients are not able to 
adequately communicate symptoms, broadening disease 
assessment tools and choosing to isolate patients sooner, 
should also be considered.
Healthcare workers
Social distancing measures, PPE guidelines and infection 
prevention policies were not adequately followed by our 
staff. This resulted in two possible clusters of transmis-
sion. The first one took place between nurses and patients 
on the psychiatric ward, whilst the second one occurred 
between junior doctors working in close proximity to one 
another in the consultation-liaison office.
Factors that contributed to a lower adherence to the 
implemented precautionary measures amongst our 
HCWs are thought to be a lack of urgency, unfamiliar-
ity with infection control measures and aspects typically 
associated with the mental health care system, such as 
frequent interdisciplinary meetings, group therapy and 
prolonged interactions with psychiatric patients, often 
taking place in close proximity. Another contributing 
factor might be that HCWs often continue to work with 
mild symptoms, and may potentially infect others while 
doing so, thereby facilitating and maintaining a nosoco-
mial outbreak [29, 30].
The outbreak might have been limited if social dis-
tancing measures, PPE guidelines and infection preven-
tion policies had been followed satisfactorily. Additional 
methods of protecting HCWs include extending screen-
ing criteria for symptoms and lowering the threshold for 
testing. Retrospectively, it is highly recommended that 
HCWs are tested sooner and more frequently.
Infrastructure
As the hospital’s infection control unit did not classify 
the psychiatric department as a high risk department, 
they were not consulted during recent renovations. 
Consequently, we were able to identify a number of 
constructional shortcomings in the departmental lay-
out which might have made our department more 
susceptible to the outbreak. For instance, five out of our 
thirteen patients’ rooms are two person rooms with one 
shared shower. Additionally, only three patient rooms 
have their own toilets. Furthermore, the ward is acces-
sible via four entrances and experiences a lot of inter-
mingling of patients, visitors and personnel. Another 
constructional flaw might have been the layout of the 
liaison psychiatry office and the outpatient clinic. Five 
work stations are located in an office of approximately 
 16m2, meaning that social distancing policies could not 
be followed. In combination with insufficient ventila-
tion and a high entry and exit rate of HCWs, it is possi-
ble that a cluster of transmissions amongst HCWs took 
place in this small office. Therefore, for future building 
renovations, it is highly recommended that the hospi-
tal infection control department is consulted in order 
to ensure a safe working environment for all employees 
and patients during infectious outbreaks, especially as 
there are concerns COVID-19 might become a recur-
ring seasonal affliction [1].
Policy
Rapidly developing insights into SARS-CoV-2 and 
COVID-19 made outbreak management strategies 
change frequently during the early stages of the pan-
demic, and especially for departments not used to 
dealing with infectious diseases, the quick succession 
of policy changes was difficult to follow and imple-
ment adequately. Consequently, due to errors in com-
munication between policymakers, managers, hospital 
staff, OHS and the hospital infection control depart-
ment, misunderstandings arose. In addition, the OHS, 
responsible for screening hospital staff, gave conflicting 
advice to employees reporting symptoms. For example, 
some of our employees reported symptoms and were 
not tested and allowed to continue working, whereas 
other employees, with the same complaints, were tested 
and received a work ban. The aforementioned makes it 
clear that it is of vital importance that a clear govern-
ance structure is in place to implement and execute 
outbreak management strategies in a time of crisis.
The medical departments in our hospital are man-
aged by both a care manager, responsible for business 
administration, and a medical manager, who is respon-
sible for medical policy and represents the department 
within the hospital. Due to unforeseen circumstances, 
our department was without a medical manager when 
the pandemic reached our hospital. The absence of 
an outspoken voice in support of our department 
might have led to an insufficient representation of our 
patients’ and HCWs’ interests during the Outbreak 
Management Team’s meetings.
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Limitations
This investigation has several limitations. Firstly, the 
identification of cases relied on self-reporting of symp-
toms. In order to increase our investigation’s reliability, 
additional symptoms were retrospectively assessed by 
carrying out questionnaires. Secondly, asymptomatic 
HCWs and patients were not tested, thereby possibly 
contributing to further transmission [31]. Thirdly, the 
identification of a potential second cluster by WGS was 
not possible, since not all samples contained sufficient 
material. Fourthly, we were not able to certainly iden-
tify the index case (patient or HCW), as SARS-CoV-2 
was already widespread in the general population at the 
time. Lastly, WGS enabled us to discriminate between 
nosocomial and community acquired infections. This 
revealed that one HCW likely acquired the infection 
outside the hospital or from a patient or HCW that was 
not sequenced. The other sequences clustered together, 
which indicates a transmission cluster. However, these 
sequences also clustered together with other sequences 
from different parts of the Netherlands, indicating that 
the confirmed cases could have contracted the infec-
tion outside the hospital. Particularly in the beginning 
of an outbreak of a novel viral pathogen, it is important 
to realize that its genetic variation is limited, and there-
fore it is crucial to relate the generated sequence data 
to epidemiological observations.
Conclusions
In conclusion, infection control measures designed for 
general hospital departments are not directly applica-
ble to psychiatric departments. Psychiatric patients 
should be considered a high-risk group for infectious 
disease, particularly during a pandemic. Therefore, gen-
eral infection prevention and outbreak management 
policies should be adjusted to fit the specific needs of 
the mental health care system. Furthermore, additional 
guidance should be given to psychiatric HCWs during 
an outbreak, as they are usually less familiar with infec-
tion prevention strategies. Finally, unambiguous com-
munication by policymakers and a clear governance 
structure are pivotal for the correct implementation of 
infection prevention measures.
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